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or district attorney. Remarks by witnesses do not have the same
weight with jurors as do official statements. Also, witnesses
cannot be fully controlled and there is not the same official
responsibility for their utterances. In these situations judicial
admonition is the normal remedy. In State v. Arena5l a police
officer, who was testifying in a bad check case as to serving
notice of the checks being dishonored, spontaneously stated that
he had recognized the defendant as a person previously arrested.
It was obvious that the district attorney was as surprised by the
utterance as was the defense. Thus the case was one where the
normal remedy of an admonition to disregard the remark was
sufficient. The prejudice was not so great as to require drastic




In Brown v. Collin.' an issue arose as to whether plaintiffs
in a personal injury suit had been guilty of contributory negli-
gence by riding with a driver whom they allegedly knew was
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. In order to estab-
lish the driver's state of inebriation, evidence had been intro-
duced that the alcoholic content of his blood was .255 mg. percent.
There was, however, no expert testimony as to the significance
of this datum, nor had blood-alcohol charts been introduced in
evidence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal took the position
that "this is a matter of scientific opinion of which the judge
may not take judicial notice,"2 concluding that no weight could
be given to the evidence of alcoholic content. With deference,
it seems to this writer that some weight could properly have
been given to the evidence. This was a case tried to a judge
alone, and one of the advantages in judge-tried cases is that a
judge is normally more competent to weigh and evaluate evi-
dence than an untrained juror. A scientific chart was readily
51. 254 La. 858, 223 So.2d 832 (1969).
52. After stating the normal relief by way of a prompt admonition to thejury to disregard, LA. CODS CmM. P. art. 771 concludes that "the court may
grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure
the defendant a fair trial."
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 223 So.2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 456.
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available and cited to the court. It seems that such charts could
properly have been used-not to determine exactly and pre-
cisely the degree of the driver's inebriation, but as a basis for
inferences of his general condition. As somewhat recognized by
the court, this is very similar to the problem of stopping charts,
and in the Guidry case8 the Third Circuit Court of Appeal very
properly stated that unless such charts have been properly in-
troduced in evidence "with proof that they are reasonably accu-
rate and relevant to the facts of the particular case, they should
be used by the court with great caution; i.e., they should be
used only for broad general comparisons and not for precise
calculations to determine speed or stopping distances."4
PESUMPTION
Alcoholic Test
LA. R.S. 32:666 provides that under certain circumstances
the refusal to submit to a chemical alcoholic test shall be ad-
missible in criminal actions arising out of the alleged conduct
of the defendant in driving while intoxicated. The constitution-
ality of admitting such evidence seems to this writer doubtful.5
In any event, as the supreme court held in City of Monroe v.
High,6 the statute does not create any presumption from the
refusal to submit to the chemical test; it merely makes the evi-
dence admissible to be weighed along with other relevant evi-
dence.
OPINION
The court held in State v. Garner7 that a police officer's
identification of a substance found on a board next to the victim
of a homicide as "blood" was not "opinion testimony." Instead,
the court took the position that the identification was "the re-
cital of a fact within the knowledge of the witness. If he was
3. Guidry v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 193 So.2d 873 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1967-1968 Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. REv. 310, 314 (1969).
4. Guidry v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 193 So.2d 873, 877 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967). The court refused to apply LA. R.S. 32:662 (1968) relative to
the admissibility of blood-alcohol content findings on the grounds that its
application is explicitly limited to criminal cases.
5. See The Work of the Lousiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REv. 321, 331 (1969) and Note, 78 YALE L.J. 1074,
1082 (1969).
6. 254 La. 362, 223 So.2d 834 (1969).
7. 255 La. 115, 229 So.2d 719 (1969).
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mistaken in his identification of the substance as blood, this
would affect the weight of his testimony but not its admissi-
bility."8 With deference, the writer disagrees. Identification of a
substance as blood seems to be the result of inference drawing
rather than direct sense perception.9 Whether the testimony was
admissible probably should be a matter within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge: admissibility should not necessarily
hinge upon whether it is properly characterized as fact or opin-
ion. Under certain circumstances, lay persons should be permitted
to testify that a substance was blood, and other times not, de-
pending on the opportunity to observe, the condition of the
substance, etc.'0 The facts presented in the instant case may be
a good illustration of the kind of situation in which a layman
should be permitted to express an opinion. The police officer had
ample opportunity to observe and to draw very reliable inferences
and it probably would have been difficult for him to describe
all of the circumstances sufficiently well for the jury to be put
in as good a position as the officer to draw the conclusion that
the substance observed was blood.
PRIVLEGE
Doctor-Patient Privilege
In State v. O'Brien"' the Supreme Court of Louisiana took
the position that LA. R.S. 13:3714 relative to the admissibility
of certified copies of hospital records as prima facie proof of
their contents overrides and pro tanto supersedes the general
provisions of LA. R.S. 15:476 establishing a doctor-patient privi-
lege in criminal cases. It seems questionable to this writer
whether R.S. 13:3714 should be so interpreted. Absent a clear
contrary indication in the statute, it could well be argued that the
hospital record article applied only to non-privileged matter. It
seems difficult for this writer to accept the proposition that the
statute authorizes the doctor, by entering confidential privileged
information in the hospital record, to waive his patient's doctor-
patient privilege.
8. Id. at 118, 229 So.2d at 720.
9. See 2 J. WiGoMm, Evmi.NC § 568 (1940) and C. McCoRMicK, EVIORNcm §§
11-12 (1954).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484 (1970). For additional discussion of the case
and the hospital records act, see p. 388 infra.
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Informer Privilege
In State v. O'Brien12 the Supreme Court of Louisiana, follow-
ing State v. Freeman8 and Scher v. United States,14 recognized
the existence of an informer privilege and held that it is not
necessary for the state to reveal the name of the informer or
person providing the police with the information underlying the
affidavit supporting the search warrant, unless it is shown that
revelation of the informer's identity is "material and essential
to appellant's defense."'15 The writer agrees that an informer
privilege should be recognized in Louisiana; it should be re-
membered, however, that there is no statutory basis for same.
In the opinion of the writer, it is necessary and appropriate in
certain circumstances for the courts to recognize a testimonial
privilege not established by the legislature.'6 This area is one
peculiarly addressing itself to the administration of justice, and
it is submitted that under the inherent power of the judiciary
the courts have the authority, within appropriate limits, to
recognize and establish evidentiary privileges.1
Accountant Privilege
Mercantile Credit Corporation v. Engstrom's of Alexandria,
Inc."' was a suit on a note between two concerns that had had
financial dealings with each other for several years. With ap-
proval of defendant, defendant's accountant had given reports
from time to time to the plaintiff on defendant's financial condi-
tion. By so doing, the Third Circuit, in one of the rare appellate
cases dealing with the accountant privilege, held that defendant
had, vis-A-vis the plaintiff, waived the privilege.
HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION
Whether an oral out-of-court statement is inadmissible hear-
say or is admissible non-hearsay often depends upon the rele-
12. Id.
13. 245 La. 665, 160 So.2d 571 (1964).
14. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
15. 255 La. 704, 712, 232 So.2d 484, 487 (1970).
16. Consider, for example, the priest-penitent relationship. There is ex-
press statutory authority for the priest-penitent privilege in criminal cases
(LA. R.S. 15:477 (1950)), but none such for civil cases.
17. An earlier interesting, but quite different, case involving the assertion
of an Informer privilege Is In re Kohn, 227 La. 253, 79 So.2d 81 (1955). In the
opinion of the writer, the court in the Kohn case was correct In denying the
availability of the informer privilege under the circumstances there pre-
sented.
18. 223 So.2d 428 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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vancy of the statement in the context of the trial; thus, admis-
sibility will often turn upon whether the pertinence of the
statement is the fact that it was said or the truth of the contents
of the statement. In State v. Nails19 the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana held that a statement made by a witness as to what her
mother had said, that "the police had been looking in the car,"20
was admissible. Since apparently the relevancy was to show not
that the police had come but that the hearer of the statement
had reason to believe the police had come, the holding seems
correct.
Similarly, whether a written instrument is inadmissible hear-
say or admissible non-hearsay is not always an easy question.21
The opinion in Freeman v. Garic22 is a very nice, succinct han-
dling of the problem. In Freeman the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal quite properly held that a written instrument by which
lessor-servitude owner granted lessee the right to exercise the
servitude in question was non-hearsay.
Information Received by Police Officer
The fact alone of an arresting officer's having received cer-
tain information may at times have independent relevance and
be admissible as non-hearsay-as, for example, outside the pres-
ence of the jury to show probable cause bearing on the validity
of an arrest or search and seizure. Usually, however, the police
officer should not be permitted to testify at the trial before the
jury as to the substance of the information received by him, for
the real relevancy of such testimony would normally be to prove
the truth of the out-of-court utterance, and hence the testimony
as to the out-of-court statement would be hearsay. The mere
fact that an arresting officer had acted on information might be
relevant admissible non-hearsay (as, for example, to explain
the police officer's conduct), but this vehicle for the admissibility
of the fact that the officer acted upon information should not
become a passkey to get to the jury the substance of the out-of-
court information, directly or indirectly, that otherwise might
be barred by the hearsay rule.
In 1948, in State v. Kimble,23 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
19. 255 La. 1070, 234 So.2d 184 (1970).
20. Id. at 1086, 234 So.2d at 190.
21. For able, extensive discussion, see Comment, 14 1. L. Rzv. 611 (1954).
22. 235 So.2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
23. 214 La. 58, 36 So.2d 637 (1948).
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reversed a defendant's conviction of a liquor violation because
the trial judge had overruled defense counsel's hearsay objec-
tions to the following question put by the district attorney to
four deputy sheriffs called by him to the stand: "Have you had
complaints that the defendant was engaged in the business of
handling and storing intoxicating liquors for the purpose of
sale?" In so ruling, the court stated:
"We think that the judge erred in not excluding the evi-
dence on the ground that it was clearly hearsay. While it is
not violative of the hearsay rule for a police officer to state
that he made an arrest or a search and seizure as the result
of information received or a complaint, the exception is
limited to the statement of the fact-for, whenever he is
permitted to explain the nature of the information or com-
plaint, he does not testify to a fact but to what someone else
told him. '24
During the past term, the supreme court, in State v. Favre,25
rejected defense counsel's hearsay objection grounded upon State
v. Kimble, and ruled that the trial court had not committed
error in permitting the district attorney to elicit from the arrest-
ing officer the fact that the police officer who made the arrest
had relied upon information given to him by two confidential
informers who previously had given information which had re-
sulted in convictions.26 With deference, it seems to this writer
that the evidence in question should have been excluded. It does
not appear that there was any real question before the jury as
to the propriety of the officer's action. The purpose of the ques-
tioning seems to have been to get to the jury the fact that prior
to the arrest two reliable informers had reported that defendant
was one of the guilty parties. The prejudicial effect of this testi-
mony presumably was greatly compounded by the testimony
extolling the virtues of the informers, the effect of which was to
uphold the veracity of the out-of-court accusers. Had this been
a proceeding outside the presence of the jury, where the issue
was whether the police had acted reasonably, then, of course,
the testimony would have been admissible as non-hearsay to
show the police officers acted upon probable cause. Here the
24. Id. at 59, 36 So.2d at 638.
25. 255 La. 690, 232 So.2d 479 (1970).
26. Justice Barham vigorously dissented to that portion of the opinion
which approved admitting testimony relative to the reliability of the In-
formers.
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issue is not the reasonableness of the policeman's conduct but
the verity of the out-of-court accusations.
Workmen's Compensation-Prima Facie Effect of Medical Reports
Section 1122 of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Act2 stipulates that if a party disputes "the report or any state-
ment therein" provided him by the opposing party pursuant to
the section, he should so notify his opponent within six days and
that "otherwise the report shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated in subsequent proceedings under this Chap-
ter."
Does the prima facie quality accorded "facts" therein stated
apply only to "objective findings" or does it extend to opinions
based upon such findings? Was the word "facts" used as con-
tradistinguished from opinions, or as a substitute for the word
"statements"? The matter is not free from doubt. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, in 1966,28 took the position that opinions
were not to be treated as prima facie evidence. The Fourth
Circuit, however, during the past term took the contrary view. 29
The writer is inclined to agree with the position taken by the
Fourth Circuit, feeling that the word "facts" as used in the
statute should not be given such a technical meaning. In the
context of the statute, it appears to this writer that "facts" and
"statements" were intended to be used synonymously. As noted,
the statute states that if the party receiving the report disputes
the report or any statement therein he should notify the other
within a stipulated period. Of course, medical reports normally
contain both objective findings and opinions, and dispute as to
any "statement" therein could be as to the opinions as much as
to the objective findings. The prima facie effect resulting from
the failure to object should presumably be accorded as much to
one as to the other.
Business Records
The stringent provisions of Civil Code article 2248 provide
that "the books of merchants can not be given in evidence in
their favor." Modern Louisiana jurisprudence, however-reacting
27. I. R.S. 23:1122 (1950).
28. Hoffpauir v. Hardware Mutual Cas. Co., 192 So.2d 588 (La. App. 8d
Mr. 1966).
29. Doss v. American Ventures, Inc., 224 So.2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969).
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to the needs of society-has greatly limited the ambit of the
article's operation. In Pritchard v. Wolfe,80 Judge (now Justice)
Tate cited and quoted with approval a succinct statement of the
teaching of modern Louisiana jurisprudence proposed by Robert
Hawthorne in a 1961 student comment in this Review.81
Hospital Records-Right of Confrontation
LA. R.S. 13:3714 authorizes admissibility of certified copies
of hospital records as prima facie proof of their contents, with
right of the adverse party to call the person making the original
record under cross-examination. In State v. Kelly,2 without
discussion as to whether the statute is applicable only to civil
cases, the court applied the statute in a criminal case. The con-
stitutionality of the article as applied to criminal cases, however,
was cast in doubt in 1965 by Pointer v. Texas,88 which held that
the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, through the Four-
teenth Amendment, is applicable to the states. During the past
term, the problem was squarely presented to the Supreme Court
of Louisiana. In State v. O'Brien8 4 a defendant was convicted of
possession of morphine tablets and sentenced as a multiple of-
fender to twenty-five years in the penitentiary. Apparently, two
days after his arrest, and at his request, defendant was taken to
Charity Hospital. At the trial the state, over objection, was per-
mitted to introduce (1) a "Route Sheet" of Charity Hospital
"diagnosing appellant's illness as withdrawal symptoms and
classifying him as a dilaudid addict" 85 and (2) a letter from the
Director of Charity Hospital (offered to establish the route
sheet's authenticity) "stating that appellant was brought to the
hospital in a car by a detective on May 18 and that his illness
was diagnosed as dilaudid addiction."8 6 Stressing that the statute
gave the defendant the right to call the person making the entry
under cross-examination, the court concluded that use of the
hospital records did not violate defendant's constitutional right
of confrontation. 87 With deference, the writer cannot agree. Both
the letter and the hospital record went to the crux of the alleged
30. 230 So.2d 612 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
31. Comment, 21 LA. L. Rsv. 449 (1961).
32. 237 La. 956, 112 So.2d 674 (1959).
33. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
34. 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484 (1970).
35. Id. at 716, 232 So.2d at 488.
36. Id.
87. As to the problem raised by the admissibility of these statements
with respect to the doctor-patient privilege, see p. 383 supra.
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crime. In the opinion of this writer, the mere fact that the en-
tries were made by a doctor (or nurse) and the director of the
hospital does not overcome the fact that the statements were not
under oath and not subject to cross-examination when made. The
state should be forced to produce the witnesses who made the
condemnatory statements rather than force the defendant to
bear the burden of finding and calling the persons who made the
entries-who, incidentally, might no longer be available. That
the statute would authorize the defendant to cross-examine the
persons who made the entries does not remove the confrontation
problem. The statute is a very salutary one in civil cases, and
it is submitted that its use should be limited to civil cases. It
seems very questionable also whether the letter from the hos-
pital director was properly admissible, for it appears to have
gone much further than the certification envisioned by the
statute.
Co-Defendant's Confession--Confrontation
In State v. Wright88 the Supreme Court of Louisiana re-
versed the conviction of one of two persons jointly tried on the
grounds that his federal constitutional right of confrontation as
set forth in Bruton v. United States 9 had been violated when
the confession of the second defendant implicating the first had
been introduced in evidence. Following the federal case law, the
supreme court held that the limiting instruction duly given by
the trial court that the confession be used only against the party
making it was insufficient safeguard. As pointed out by Justice
Sanders in his well-reasoned dissent, the first defendant had not
objected to the admissibility of the confession on the confronta-
tion grounds, nor had he previously moved to sever. The writer
agrees with the majority position, however, that this should not
have barred relief. Federal constitutional rights were involved
and it would appear clear that they were not waived by non-
assertion. 40 Since presumably the defect was one which would
ultimately prove fatal to the conviction, it seems proper to this
writer for the Supreme Court of Louisiana to have remedied it
in the instant proceeding, despite the absence of the confrontation
objection. Otherwise, defendant would have been relegated to
relief via writs to the United States Supreme Court or by col-
38. 254 La. 521, 225 So.2d 201 (1969).
39. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
40. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 705 (1966).
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lateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings in state or federal
'courts-and dockets are already over-encumbered by collateral
attacks.
IDENTIFICATION
Several cases decided during the past term involved the
propriety of identification testimony. Of particular interest is
State v. Pratt.41 In United States v. Wade42 the United States
Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to counsel at
a line-up proceeding. It further held, however, that the fact that
the in-court identification had been prefaced by an out-of-court
line-up at which the defendant was unrepresented by counsel
did not in that case require a new trial if the government could
"establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court
identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other
than the line up identification." 48
In State v. Pratt"4 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that
despite the fact that defendant had not been represented at an
out-of-court line-up proceeding, in-court identification was un-
tainted and admissible as being of "independent origin" and
based on "a prior opportunity to observe." 45 Whether an in-court
,identification is "purged of the primary taint" is, of course, not
easy to determine. The court in Pratt did not extensively elabo-
,rate the factual foundation for the finding, and it seems ques-
.tionable to this writer whether the facts outlined by the court
would satisfy the showing required by the United States Supreme
Court. It seems that the Wade case was designed to insure cer-
tain protections for a suspect in police custody, and it is danger-
ous for investigatory personnel not to follow these procedures
and to rely upon an expectation that it will be possible to show
that in-court identification is based on a source independent of
the line-up.4
41. 255 La. 919, 233 So.2d 883 (1970).
42. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
43. Id. at 240.
44. 255 La. 919, 233 So.2d 883 (1970).
45. Id. at 939, 233 So.2d at 890, quoting the trial judge's per curiam.
46. For an interesting case decided during the past term reflecting meth-
ods designed to Insure representation of suspects at line-ups, see State v.
Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So.2d 825 (1970). The opinion sets forth testimony
by an "attorney connected with Legal Aid" as follows:
"'I went over to the Federal Lockup [Orleans] and interviewed a number
of people who were booked at that time with the crime of armed robbery. I
interviewed them on this premise: Whether or not they had a counsel or a
lawyer of their own at that time and for those who said they did not, I told
[Vol. 31
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Apparently, in the Pratt case there was no testimony before
the jury as to the improper out-of-court line-up identification.
If there had been, it would presumably have been a fatal defect,
for in Wade there is strong indication that the United States
Supreme Court would apply a "per se rule of exclusion" where
there is in-court testimony of an out-of-court illegal line-up. In
Wade, the Court stated:
"Where, as here, the admissibility of evidence of the lineup
identification itself is not involved, a per se rule of exclusion
of courtroom identification would be unjustified. A rule
limited solely to the exclusion of testimony concerning iden-
tification at the lineup itself, without regard to admissibility
of the courtroom identification, would render the right to
counsel an empty one." 4 [Footnote and citation of authority
omitted.]
Does the rule of the Wade case apply to out-of-court showing
of photographs as well as to physical line-up procedures? In
State v. Nails" out-of-court identifications had initially been
made by the witness from sets of photographs shown to him by
deputies of the sheriff's department. At this time, defendant had
not yet been arrested. Pointing out that at the time the photo-
graphs were originally shown to the witness defendant was un-
represented by counsel, defense counsel (relying on United
States v. Wade) urged that the in-court identification testimony
was inadmissible as tainted by the out-of-court identification.
Rejecting this argument, the court properly differentiated cases
where defendant has already been arrested or indicted, and cases
in the pre-arrest, investigative stage. In the latter instance, it
obviously is impractical to have lawyers present on behalf of
all persons whose photographs are shown to eyewitnesses. None-
theless, it seems clear that there is a potential for abuse where
such photographs are shown even in the investigative stage,
and the police should proceed fairly. Speaking of initial pre-
trial photographic identification, the United States Supreme
Court in Simmons v. United States stated:
them that I would be available as their attorney for the purpose of the
line-up alone to make sure that they got a fair line-up, and Number Two,
to be able to report to their attorneys at a later date as to what transpired
at that line-up. And to each of these men I gave my card if I had one avail-
able and to each of them I promised I would let them know the results of
the line-up after it was finished. Mr. Johnson was one of these men who said
he did not have counsel.'" Id. at 323-24, 230 So.2d at 828.
47. 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
48. 255 La. 1070, 234 So.2d 184 (1970).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"We are unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the
exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter
of constitutional requirement. Instead, we hold that each
case must be considered on its own facts, and that convic-
tions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a
-pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on
that ground only if the photographic identification procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 4 9




. Wigmore and McCormick both take the position that when
a party on the stand uses a memorandum to refresh his recol-
lections, the opponent's lawyer is entitled to inspect the docu-
ment.5 They also would go further and extend the rule to apply
where the witness before taking the stand has consulted a writ-
ing to refresh his memory. In State v. Nails5' the Supreme Court
of Louisiana rejected the latter view, however, and upheld the
trial court's refusal to force the district attorney to produce a
memorandum prepared by the deputy sheriff following his in-
terview with a robbery eyewitness, and read to the witness prior
to the witness's taking the stand. The problem is apparently one
of first impression in Louisiana. Although the writer would
prefer the Wigmore-McCormick view, the position taken by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana seems to accord with the majority
American position.
BILLS OF EXCEPTION
Several cases decided during the past term reflect the need
for a new look at our bill of exception procedure in criminal
cases. The availability of electronic recording devices, federal
decisions relative to an indigent's right to a free transcript of
trial testimony,52 and federal case law as to waiver of federal
49. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
50. 3 J. WoMoiw, EVIDENCE 1 762 (1940) and C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 9
(1954).
51. 255 La. 1070, 234 So.2d 184 (1970).
52. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and its progeny.
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 393
constitutional rights, all militate in favor of change. Justice
Barham's dissent in State v. Garner" makes the point especially
well.64
HARMLEss ERRoR
In a cogent and well-reasoned dissent in State v. Anderson,55
Justice Barham persuasively analyzes the problems encountered
with respect to the application of state and federal harmless
error rules to the violation in state court of defendant's federal
constitutional rights. His able dissent incisively elucidates the
dangers inherent in a joint trial of defendants where it is con-
templated that their confessions implicating themselves and each
other are to be used, but by court instruction are to be given
limited effect only.5 6 Louisiana's persistence in refusing to grant
an indigent defendant a right to a full, free transcript of the
trial testimony 57 compounds the difficulties in deciding that a
particular trial court error was "harmless."
53. 255 La. 115, 229 So.2d 719 (1970).
54. See also the discussion of State v. Wright, 254 La. 521, 225 So.2d 201
(1969) p. 389 supra.
55. 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329 (1969).
56. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 254 La. 521, 225 So.2d 201 (1969), discussed
p. 389 supra. See also Justice Barham's earlier dissent in this connection in
State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969).
57. See State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329 (1969).
